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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates whether financial cooperatives are crowded out by commercial 
banks in the process of financial sector development. We use a self-constructed database 
(1990-2011) of financial cooperatives in 55 developing countries. Our empirical results are 
threefold. First, financial cooperatives tend to reach more members in countries where the 
commercial banking sector is weak. This validates their role as a market failure solution. 
Second, in the process of commercial bank expansion, financial cooperatives run the risk 
of being crowded out. Third, financial cooperatives seem to benefit from some kind of bank 
presence, especially as far as savings mobilization is concerned.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The idea that everyone has to have access to affordable financial services is widely 
supported by international development organizations like the World Bank and the United 
Nations (Cull et al., 2013). Financial sector development is considered to be a necessary 
precondition for economic growth and poverty alleviation.1 In the developing world, there 
are different types of formal and informal financial institutions (Cull et al., 2013). Among 
them, financial cooperatives are one of the earliest and most widespread forms of 
alternative financial institutions across the world (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998; Fonteyne, 
2007). Typically they are created to fill a gap left by commercial banks that find it too 
costly and too risky to lend to poor or rural people. Consequently, they serve financially 
excluded people and create access to finance for an important number of people. Actually, 
it is estimated that financial cooperatives serve more than 81 million people in developing 
countries (WOCCU, 2012). 
 
Beyond their pure financial role, financial cooperatives also play a social role. They are 
alternative financial institutions pushed by self-help dynamism where values of, 
democracy, equity and solidarity are a common base (Guinnane, 1994; Branch and Baker, 
2000; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). They often work for the mutual interest of their 
members and additionally support the local development of their area. Furthermore, the 
recent financial crisis has questioned the large size of banks (Schoenmaker and 
Werkhoven, 2013) and the mainstream banking models (Groeneveld and de Vries, 2009). 
Different studies have demonstrated the importance to preserve institutional diversity 
(Hesse and Cihák, 2007; Ayadi et al., 2010; Liikanen et al., 2012; Ferri et al., 2014). 
Therefore alternative financial institutions are put in the spotlight and the interaction 
between the two sectors becomes a crucial issue. 
 
One could wonder, indeed, what happens when the commercial banking sector develops. 
On the one hand, one could expect that the sectors are complementary. The two types of 
institutions serve other people and synergies between the two sectors make them develop 
                                                 
1 Wang and Wong (2009) show however that the effect of financial investment on economic growth is 
dependent on the level of human capital in a country. 
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simultaneously. However, one could also argue that once sufficiently developed, the two 
sectors start competing. Once commercial banks develop, they become interested in the 
market served by cooperatives and take over their clients. In this argumentation one could 
speculate whether financial cooperatives are just a step in financial sector development: 
they open up the market and then the commercial banks take over crowding them out.  
 
While the cooperative sector in Europe and the US has managed to keep a relatively large 
market share, cooperatives in these countries were developed in a very different context 
being protected from market globalization and international competition at the early stage 
of their development and sometimes benefiting from favorable legislations.  In the 19th 
century, financial market globalization was still low or even inexistent and international 
competition only started to emerge. As Guinnane (2011) argues the commercial banking 
model was at the early stages of its development too and large multinational banks did not 
exist yet. In developing countries, current financial cooperatives face competition from 
national commercial banks, but also from multinational financial institutions. The last three 
decades of financial liberalization have increased the presence of foreign banks in 
developing countries (Balmaceda et al., 2014). Furthermore, in some developed countries, 
financial cooperatives also benefited from favorable legislations, as was the case for 
German financial cooperatives (Guinnane, 2002). Even up to now, in the US, credit unions 
are exempt from federal corporate income taxes (Hansmann, 1996; Wilcox, 2006).  
 
Therefore, in times where institutional diversity is set high at the international agenda, it is 
extremely valuable to assess how financial cooperatives in the developing world are 
influenced in the process of overall financial sector development and whether or not they 
are crowded out by commercial banks. 
 
This paper looks at the relationship between the development of the commercial and 
cooperative financial sector in developing countries where the level of financial 
development is still low. Using a hand-collected database based on the World Council of 
Credit of Unions (WOCCU)2 data, we assess the relationship for a panel of 55 countries 
                                                 
2 WOCCU is an international association promoting the development of credit unions and other types of 
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over the years 1990 to 2011. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that 
addresses this issue empirically. 
 
Our results hint towards the existence of competition between the two sectors on the macro 
level. This is, where the development of the commercial banking sector is low, there is a 
higher development of the cooperative sector in terms of the number of institutions as well 
as the number of people served. This reaffirms the positive role that cooperatives play in 
overcoming banking market failure. In countries where the commercial sector is less 
developed, people associate in cooperatives that play a vital role in creating access to 
finance. However, in the process of financial development they encounter a risk of being 
crowded out by commercial banks.  
 
But, the results also suggest a more complex relationship since financial cooperatives seem 
to benefit from a certain extent of commercial banking activity in the sense that the 
existence of banks provides them with an infrastructure to secure their savings. Indeed, we 
find a positive relationship between banking development and the average level of savings 
cooperatives gather. It could also be that through financial sector development the overall 
savings culture of the country is positively stimulated, creating a positive spillover effect. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature on financial 
cooperatives and explores the possible relationship between the commercial banking sector 
and the cooperative one. In Section 3, the data and methodology are explained. Section 4 
presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes and proposes a number of 
policy-oriented recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
financial cooperatives around the world. It provides technical assistance to financial cooperatives, advocates 
for them within international organizations and works with national governments to improve legislation and 
regulation. WOCCU is mainly funded by its members, which are financial cooperatives 
(http://www.woccu.org/about). 
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II. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FINANCIAL COOPERATIVES AND 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
 
The two main challenges for lending institutions are screening valid projects and securing 
the repayment of loans. Lending institutions often do not possess sufficient information on 
the project and the morality of the client. This information asymmetry leads to two 
problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. To overcome those problems and secure the 
risk they take, commercial banks ask collateral to their borrowers. Potential viable clients, 
who are not able to provide such a collateral, can become involuntary excluded. This results 
in suboptimum credit allocation and is generally known as market failure (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981)3.  
 
Commercial privately owned banks lack especially information on specific groups of 
individuals such as poor and people living in remote communities, who also are often not 
able to provide any valuable collateral (Fischer and Ghatak, 2011). Furthermore, private-
owned banks are usually not able to monitor poor borrower’s behavior and enforce 
contracts, since they are not part of local society and can be considered as outside financiers 
(Conning and Udry, 2007). Therefore they lack the ability to impose both financial as well 
as social sanctions (Besley et al., 1993). In such situation, cooperatives have an efficiency 
advantage, since they have access to better information about borrowers. Additionally, they 
have the ability to use a diverse set of sanctions, which are traditionally not available to 
outside bankers (Guinnane, 2001).  
 
Financial cooperatives can be defined as member-owned institutions that provide financial 
and social services to their members and the local communities in which they are located 
(Forker et al., 2014). They have a democratic governance structure and generally apply the 
one-member one-vote rule. Since, elected members running the cooperative and 
supervising credit allocation belong to the community, they are able to gather the necessary 
                                                 
3 Contrary to what is predicted by economic theory, the price cannot be used to clear the financial market. 
Indeed, an increase in the interest rate results in an increase of the credit risk. So the nature of the transaction 
is affected by the price (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
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information on the borrowers. Being aware that loans are made with their savings, all 
members have also an incentive to monitor neighbors-borrowers. Additionally, they have 
the ability to mobilize cheap and efficient reimbursement incentive mechanisms. Since 
members are highly socially and economically interconnected, they can easily punish a bad 
payer by, for example, stopping social and economic interaction with him (Banerjee et al., 
1994). Finally, the transaction costs of these institutions are lower, since they are often 
based in the community and are partly voluntarily run by their members (Forker et al., 
2014). 
 
Another type of organization that has found innovative ways to solve information 
asymmetries are microfinance institutions (MFIs). By using innovative lending 
methodologies and new product designs, like for example the group lending methodology 
or progressive lending through small amounts with weekly or monthly repayments, they 
have been able to create access to finance for the previously unbanked (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2010). These types of organizations, set up during the 1980s4, were traditionally 
set up as NGOs, while an increasing number has transformed into more commercial 
institutions and some fully into commercial banks. Consequently, the term MFIs currently 
comprises a whole range of institutions. Sometimes, financial cooperatives are also labeled 
MFIs. However, cooperatives differ in a fundamental manner from them. Cooperatives use 
their member-owned institutional design to overcome information asymmetries, while 
traditional MFIs address information asymmetry by innovative lending methodologies. In 
that sense traditional MFIs are more similar to commercial banks in their institutional 
design. Since the recent crisis has shown the importance to preserve institutional diversity, 
we think it is important to treat financial cooperatives as different and therefore focus on 
the relationship between cooperatives and commercial banks5. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The most well known MFI is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Other well-known institutions are the BRI 
in Indonesia and BancoSol in Bolivia (Armendáriz and Labie, 2011). 
5 The relationship between microfinance sector and traditional financial sector development has already been 
explored by Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013). In the econometric analyses we do control for the extent of 
the microfinance sector in order to identify their interaction.  
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According to Kalmi (2007) cooperatives are oriented towards broader social goals, which 
make them fundamentally different from private investor-owned corporations. The 
International Cooperative Alliance (ICA)6 shows that since financial cooperatives are 
member-based and self-governed, there is a positive effects on members’ level of human 
capital. Furthermore, cooperatives actively provide education and training for their 
members and employees (Périlleux et al., 2012). They also inform the general public about 
the nature and benefits of cooperation (Ward and McKillop, 2010). Additionally, 
cooperatives work and support local economic development, since they finance small-scale 
producers and farmers. Finally, they are committed to community development through 
investment in philanthropic projects and charities and have a self-help focus (Ryder and 
Chambers, 2009; Benedikter, 2011).  
 
However, cooperative ownership also has a number of limitations. Since they are member-
owned, cooperatives tend to have a higher cost of ownership. Hansmann (1996) argues that 
the cost of decision-making is increased due to many voters and a lack of efficient 
management control. This last aspect is even more problematic in developing countries, 
where members can be illiterate and have generally low qualification to supervise 
management’s accounting activity (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006). Although financial 
cooperatives avoid owners-depositors agency issues, they have more difficulties to align 
members’ and managers’ interests. Due to their social mission, it is more complicated for 
cooperatives to define clear-cut indicators of managers’ performances and incentive 
mechanisms, this contrarily to commercial banks that can use stock-related compensation 
mechanisms (Wilcox, 2006).   
 
Moreover, the cooperative members’ savings determine to a large extent the lending 
portfolio. So cooperatives often have limited lending portfolio and they offer a more limited 
range of products compared to private banks (Guinnane, 2011; Périlleux, 2013). In 
particular, cooperatives face an important maturity mismatch issue. Their collected savings 
are typically short-term since poor people save, but are not able to block their savings for 
                                                 
6 ICA is the international association of cooperatives including any sectors (http://ica.coop; consulted August 
2015).  
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a longer period. Therefore it is difficult for cooperatives to provide long-term investment 
loans. 
 
For the above-mentioned reasons, financial cooperatives are different from private-owned 
banks. We could define them as complements of the commercial financial sector, since 
they perform a different role. In this sense, financial cooperatives solve the market failure 
created by commercial banks and provide additional social benefits to members of society. 
But, financial sector development, characterized by an increase in the commercial bank 
branch network and the number of products offered, could eventually crowd out 
cooperative development, since they offer more advanced products and tend to be less time-
consuming. In this aspect, financial sector development would have a negative effect on 
cooperative finance development. 
 
While cooperatives are often seen as alternatives to commercial banks, the two sectors are 
not entirely disconnected. Namely, cooperatives in their development process use the 
commercial banking sector for a number of reasons, which could result in positive 
synergies between the two segments of the financial sector. Looking at the literature, we 
can identify three important synergies. First, there is the need to secure savings. For 
financial cooperatives, the protection of members’ savings is crucial. However, many small 
financial cooperatives, as well as bigger networks, cannot afford to invest in safe 
infrastructures in order to keep their financial resources protected. So these financial 
cooperatives often rely on banks to safely store the surplus of their members’ savings. 
Andersen and Malchow-Moller (2006) stress the comparative advantages between funding 
versus information costs in formal and informal sectors. Thanks to the ownership structure 
financial cooperatives have lower information costs on their members than banks. 
However, they have higher deposit costs than banks, the latter having larger and more 
secure infrastructure. Therefore, cooperatives could make use of the bank’s advantage in 
terms of infrastructure to safely store their surplus. A second synergy between commercial 
banks and financial cooperatives results from the need for liquidity transfer facilities 
between local financial cooperatives that are affiliated to a network.7 Financial 
                                                 
7 Financial cooperatives grow mainly through networking: local financial cooperatives group themselves in 
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cooperatives could use the commercial banking system to transfer liquidities from one 
affiliated cooperative to another. Obviously, banks do not have a branch in every working 
area of the cooperative network, but still, they are often nation-wide present, which could 
greatly facilitate the circulation of liquidities inside the cooperative network (Périlleux, 
2013). Thirdly, links with the banking system enable financial cooperatives to broaden the 
scope of services they offer, with products such as salaries domiciliation or remittances 
transfers. These products require financial cooperatives to have bank accounts or to work 
as bank subcontractors. The development of remittances services is seen as essential in 
providing financial services to poorer households (Sukadi Mata, 2012; Aggarwal et al., 
2011) and in some countries, financial cooperatives are starting to provide these services 
as a banks’ subcontractor (Evans and Klaehn, 2004). All these positive synergies would 
predict that cooperatives benefit with the commercial banking sector development.  
 
As shown by Guinnane (2002 and 2011), those positive synergies were present in Germany 
during the 19th century and financial cooperatives benefited from commercial bank sector 
development. For example, urban financial cooperatives used the Dresdner Bank as their 
Central. The Dresdner bank was a large and important nationwide commercial bank 
providing a huge variety of services with a special department offering liquidity and 
payment services to financial cooperatives.  In particular, Guinnane (2011) explains: ‘More 
concretely, when a cooperative made a loan, it did not send out two men on a motorbike 
with cash, as some other micro-lenders today are forced to do. The cooperative could write 
the borrower a check drawn on a Central or commercial bank. And if the borrower wanted 
cash in excess of what the cooperative had on hand, the cooperative could obtain the cash 
from its Central via Post Office money transfers.’ Financial cooperatives thus benefited 
from the entire financial infrastructure that came along with commercial bank sector 
development. 
                                                 
networks with a central apex to benefit from economy of scale, liquidity management facilities, additional 
supervision ensured by the network, etc. The structure of those networks is heterogeneous. Financial 
cooperative networks can have two or three-tier nodes, including regional and national central unions. Their 
level of integration also varies a lot: in highly integrated networks, many tasks and policies are centralized, 
whereas in decentralized networks, major tasks such as human resources management, and policies, such as 
the setting of interest rate on loans, continue to be carried out by the local cooperatives (Desrochers and 
Fischer 2005).    
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In conclusion, the literature suggests that the interaction between financial cooperative 
development and commercial bank sector development is complex and can be both 
negative (market failure hypothesis) as well as positive (synergies). So what does reality 
tell us? If we look at history, during the 19th century financial cooperatives were created to 
provide financial services to financially excluded people in Europe and North America 
(Fonteyne, 2007). In those countries, especially the rural areas suffered from a lack of 
access to finance. Consequently a lot of cooperatives were created in those districts. In 
cities, certain types of people also had difficulties to access finance, often due to a lack of 
sufficient collateral. Urban artisans, small shopkeepers, and ‘handworkers’, were not seen 
as viable clients to commercial banks. Consequently, they organized themselves into 
financial cooperatives (Hollis and Sweetman, 1998; Guinnane, 2001). In these countries, 
financial cooperatives have suffered from isomorphic pressures (Kalmi, 2014): financial 
development, structural changes, competition, the development of rating agencies and 
regulatory frameworks have pushed the cooperative sector to progress into bigger 
structures functioning on a similar basis as classical commercial banks. This trend has 
opened the debate on cooperative identity, how to preserve it and the role that cooperatives 
play in financial sector development (Côté, 2001). 
 
The reality in developing countries shows that the cooperative financial sector continues to 
fill a gap left by the commercial banking sector in the sense that they mainly serve 
financially excluded people (Rogaly, 1998; Cuevas and Fischer, 2006; Hirschland et al., 
2008 ; Hartarska et al., 2012). So, one can wonder what happens when the commercial 
banking sector further develops and how the possible positive synergies between the two 
sectors influence the development of both segments. Are financial cooperatives only one 
step in financial sector development and crowded out by commercial bank growth, or do 
the two sectors develop simultaneously? In what follows, the empirical analysis tries to 
reveal the direction of the relationship.  
 
 
 
 
- 10 - 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
According to World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), cooperatives serve more than 
81 million people in developing countries. WOCCU assembles statistical information of 
cooperative institutions all over the world on an annual basis. According to WOCCU 
(2009:1), their aim is ‘to measure credit union growth and member service trends 
worldwide’. They often collaborate with a number of national representative institutions to 
obtain a full overview of the state of the financial cooperative sector in one country.8 
Therefore and since it is the international umbrella of the cooperative movement, we 
suppose that WOCCU-data represents the general state of development of the financial 
cooperative sectors over the world. 
 
The WOCCU council employs a comprehensive definition of cooperative finance. In 
general, they refer to Credit Unions, but specify that credit unions receive various names 
around the world. The WOCCU-database includes financial cooperatives, SACCOs 
(Savings and Credit Cooperatives), caisses d’épargne et de crédit, and other small-scale 
financial organizations working on a cooperative basis.9 In general, these institutions are 
user-owned financial cooperatives that offer savings, credit and other financial services to 
their members (WOCCU, 2012). The WOCCU only gathers information on financial 
cooperatives and does not include cooperative banks.10 This prevents any double counting 
between financial cooperative and commercial bank development. Furthermore, in 
developing countries, they are small-scale financial institutions that traditionally not show 
up in the World Bank development indicators, as argued by Honohan (2008). 
 
The data on the development of the financial cooperative sector represents an unbalanced 
panel composed of 55 developing countries for the period from 1990 to 2011 with an 
                                                 
8 For instance, the WOCCU-data for West Africa comes from microfinance department of the West African 
Central Bank, which has the most complete information on West African financial cooperatives. 
9 It includes all “member-owned, not-for-profit financial cooperatives that provide savings, credit and other 
financial services to their members” (www.woccu.org; consulted August 2015). 
10 This is not the case for India. Therefore, in the empirical analysis (see further below) we have tested with 
and without India, but the results did not change. We present the test with India, but the test without India is 
available upon request. 
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average of 21 years per country. Regarding geography, the database includes 25 African 
Countries (out of 54), 18 Central and Latin American Countries (out of 19) and 12 Asian 
Countries (out of 51) including the most important ones, such as India and Bangladesh, but 
not China (see Appendix A for details).  
 
In order to test the relationship between commercial financial sector development and the 
cooperative sector, a panel data regression model is developed. Three dependent variables 
representing two dimensions of financial cooperative development are calculated. First, 
two outreach variables are defined to measure the degree of penetration of the cooperative 
sector at the country level. The Outreach No Members variable indicates the number of 
people served by the sector. It is obtained by summing up all the members of the financial 
cooperatives at the country level and dividing it by the country population older than fifteen 
years11. The Outreach No Institutions variable indicates the number of institutions for 
100,000 inhabitants. Second, the capacity to mobilize savings is measured: FC Savings. 
We define this as the average savings per cooperative member. We calculate this variable 
by dividing the total savings collected by financial cooperatives through the total amount 
of members. The empirical analysis investigates the impact of the commercial banking 
sector on these measures, while controlling for different parameters.  
 
The general specification of the model can be presented as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 
𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽7𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                    (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 measures financial cooperative development in terms of the three variables 
outlined above. The main explanatory variable of interest is labeled BANK which 
measures commercial banking sector development in terms of several dimensions 
(Levine, 2005; Cull et al., 2014). First, the total domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector expressed in percentage of GDP (Bank Credit) is used. This variable gives an 
                                                 
11 In the WDI database we find total population and population >15 years. We take the last variable since it 
is mainly this part of the population that makes use of financial services.  
- 12 - 
indication of the overall penetration rate i.e. the depth of the commercial banking sector. 
Secondly, we analyze the impact of the banks’ network coverage using two variables:  the 
number of branches of commercial banks per 100,000 adults (Bank Branch) and the 
number of automated teller machines per 100,000 adults (Bank ATM).   
 
We control for a number of macro-economic factors that have been demonstrated to 
influence financial sector development: inflation, GNI per capita, GNI growth rate, aid 
per capita (AID) and foreign direct investment in GDP percentage (FDI) and population 
density (Pop Density is the population per square km) (Ahlin et al., 2011; Cull et al., 
2014). We also control for regional disparities by including regional dummies. In 
addition, we also test the relationship controlling for the extent of the microfinance sector. 
Finally,  µi is the unobserved heterogeneous effect capturing the time-invariant 
unobserved country characteristics and uit is the error term.  
 
The data on the macro-environmental factors comes from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI). This database contains also the traditional measures of financial sector 
development (Levine, 2005; Cull et al., 2014). We use MIX market data12 to construct a 
proxy to capture the development of the microfinance sector on a country level. 
Microfinance outreach is the total number of micro-borrowers of MFIs active in one 
country divided by the total population older than 15 years.  
 
We first estimate the parameters of the regression equation using pooled OLS, Random 
Effects and Fixed Effects estimation. The Random Effects model takes into account the 
unobserved difference across countries thereby reducing concerns for omitted variables 
bias. Additionally, it allows us to control for variables for which we do not have time-
series. We also report the results of the Fixed Effect regressions where this is appropriate. 
We use clustered standard errors that are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Next, in order to test the robustness of our results, we run a number of 
additional tests. First, to reduce concerns for endogeneity-bias resulting from reversed 
causality in the sense that both sectors influence one another, we run the same regression 
                                                 
12 The Mix market (www.mixmarket.org) is the biggest online MFI database (consulted August 2015).  
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using instruments. Specifically, we run IV-regressions in which Bank Credit is 
instrumented by several variables such as the cost of business start-up procedures13; 
number of start-up procedures to register a business; number of procedures to register 
property; time required to enforce a contract and number of procedures to enforce a 
contract. These variables are chosen as instruments because they are related to overall 
financial sector development. They help banks to enforce contracts and help formal 
enterprises, which are typically the clients of banks (Chen, 2012), to develop. Therefore 
we can argue that these variables are related to the total amount of credit disbursed by 
banks, but not directly related to financial cooperative development, since cooperatives 
use less formal procedures and manage credit default and conflict in a more informal way 
using peer pressures (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Financial cooperatives typically 
serve informal enterprises, which cannot provide formal guarantees or regular business 
plans. In addition, we estimate the parameters of the equation using Hausman-Taylor 
regressions (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). Basically, this is an IV-approach were 
instruments are generated from the underlying equation to account for any bias resulting 
from correlation between the unobserved heterogeneous effect 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 and the error term uit.  
  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
4.1. Descriptive relationships between the two financial segments 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the main variables in the sample. This table shows 
that financial cooperatives, on average, serve 4.5% of the national population older than 
fifteen years and there are around 2.7 institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in a country.14 
Their members have an average savings balance of US$647. Regarding the development 
of the commercial financial sector, on average commercial banks in a country distribute an 
amount of credit that equals 46.72% of the GDP, and a total of 27 ATMs and 11 branches 
per 100,000 inhabitants.  
                                                 
13 This is the cost to register a business normalized as a percentage of GNI/cap (WDI-indicators), see 
Appendix B. 
14 These averages are relatively similar between regions. Financial cooperatives in Latin America serve on 
average 5.4% of the population, whereas they serve 4.6% of the population in Africa and 2.9% in Asia. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
    n mean median min max 
Financial cooperatives        
Outreach No Members FC members in country divided by population > 15y 937 4.5 2.3 0.002 42.62 
Outreach No Institutions FC institutions per 100,000 inhabitants 956 2.68 1.04 0.001 45.37 
FC Savings FC savings in USD divided by FC members 934 647 263 0 14,614 
       
Commercial financial sector       
Bank Credit domestic credit as % of GDP 1,131 46.72 36.47 0.18 319.53 
Bank ATMs # ATMs per 100,000 inhabitants 280 26.72 16.01 0 270.12 
Bank Branches branches per 100,000 inhabitants 343 10.94 7.72 0.38 58.66 
       
Macro-economic controls       
Inflation annual % change in consumer prices 970 9.87 7.01 0.31 57.03 
GNIcap GNI per capita in 2005 PPP-adjusted $ 1,012 4,524 3,354 75.86 27,611 
GNIgrowth annual % change in GNI per capita 1,042 2.19 2.48 -75.94 188.79 
FDI net inflow foreign direct investment in % of GDP 1,107 2.78 2.08 0 17.13 
Aid development aid received in USD divided by population 1,168 36.81 23.03 0.01 250.68 
Popdensity people per square km of land 1,180 122.48 57.98 1.71 1,156 
 
 
In Table 2 we report univariate correlations and test differences in mean between the 
cooperative and commercial financial sector variables15. In general we observe a negative 
relationship between the development of the cooperative and commercial financial sector. 
Cooperative institutions serve significantly fewer members when more credit is provided 
by the commercial sector. This both in terms of the correlation (-0.14) and in terms of 
difference in means: 3.3% of the population is served by financial cooperatives in the part 
of the sample that has the highest level of financial development (top 25%), while almost 
5% of the population is served by cooperatives in the part of the sample with the lowest 
financial sector development (bottom 25%). Additionally, there are less cooperative 
institutions when more credit is provided by the commercial banking sector, although this 
                                                 
15 Simple correlation tests between the different variables measuring cooperative development demonstrate 
a positive relationship between outreach and number of cooperatives. Additionally, there is a positive 
correlation between financial cooperatives’ outreach and the different variables measuring commercial 
financial sector development. 
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difference is not statistically significant. All this is in support of the banking failure 
hypothesis outlined above. Interestingly, where the banking sector is more developed and 
thus is providing more credit, people tend to save more in cooperatives. This is in line with 
the previously explained positive synergies between the two segments.  
 
These statistics demonstrate that commercial banking and financial cooperatives influence 
each other and the relationship seems to be negative. In contrast, financial cooperatives’ 
ability to collect savings is positively correlated with commercial finance development. To 
investigate these relationships in more depth a multivariate analysis is exerted in what 
follows. 
 
Table 2  
Relationship between financial cooperative sector and commercial financial sector: correlation 
and T-test analyses 
  Correlation     Difference of means 
 Bank Credit   Bank Credit  
    High Low T-test 
Outreach No Members -0.138***  Mean 0.033 0.049 3.30*** 
No obs 912  No obs 240 207  
       
Outreach No Institutions -0.039  Mean 1.86 1.95 0.656 
No obs 931  No obs 257 203  
       
FC savings 0.206***  Mean 1086 292 -7.45*** 
No obs 910   No obs 248 203   
Notes: High is defined as top 25%, Low defined as bottom 25%. 
 
 
4.2. The role of commercial bank sector development 
We first look at the impact of the development of the commercial banking sector, in terms 
of Bank Credit on the outreach of financial cooperatives. Regressions (1), (2) and (3)16 in 
Table 3 show that financial cooperatives reach significantly more members in countries 
                                                 
16 We see that the joint model statistics (F-stats, R²) are much lower and thus less reliable in the FE-
regressions. Additionally, we investigated the appropriateness of RE-regressions using the ‘Breusch-Pagan 
Langrange Multiplier-test for Random-Effects’ which basically assesses the null that the variance of the 
unobserved effect is zero thus that no random effects is required. The outcome is that the null hypothesis 
cannot be upheld, suggesting RE is indeed an appropriate method. 
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where the banking sector is less developed. An increase of 1 percentage-point (or %-point) 
in Bank Credit leads to a 0.03 percentage-point (or %-point) reduction in cooperative 
members. This result is consistent when controlling for macro-economic variables as well 
as for population density and regional disparities. The results indicate that the overall level 
of credit disbursed by the banking sector is negatively related with the outreach of financial 
cooperatives. Cooperatives are reaching more members in countries where the banking 
sector is weak. With the expansion of the banking sector, the outreach of financial 
cooperatives diminishes. This is in line with Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) who do a 
similar analysis for the microfinance sector. Just as microfinance institutions, financial 
cooperatives seem to solve the market failure created by commercial banks but are 
negatively influenced by deepening of the commercial financial sector. The results suggest 
that although these alternative financial institutions through their member-based approach 
are committed to their member needs, the costs for members, in terms of time and 
involvement, are high (Hansmann, 1996). Furthermore, the financial cooperative’s lending 
portfolio is mostly limited to the savings of their members. Therefore, once commercial 
banks are more developed they can provide services at a lower cost and offer a wider range 
of products (Guinnane, 2011), making them attractive. 
 
Regarding outreach in terms of institutions, columns (4), (5) and (6) confirm the negative 
relationship but, in line with the univariate statistics, the effect is only significant in the 
OLS regression and not in the RE of FE-regressions. Overall, we can conclude that the 
number of cooperative institutions is lower in more developed financial countries 
suggesting that cooperatives stand in some kind of competition with banks. This entails 
that the number of cooperative institutions reduces as the commercial bank sector develops, 
although the effect here is smaller than with the number of people served. 
 
Regarding our control variables, especially the level of economic development is 
significant. The level of GNI per capita positively influences the outreach of 
cooperatives17. This suggests that cooperatives need a certain level of development to start 
                                                 
17 Also AID has a positive and in some cases a significant relationship (IV and HT). Since development aid 
programs are often directed towards poor and rural communities, the results suggest that it helps to reach a 
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to develop, as also Ahlin et al. (2011) find for microfinance institutions. In order to explore 
this relationship in more depth, subsection 4.3 presents split-sample regressions and 
interaction-effects18.  
 
Table 3  
Baseline regression results 
    Outreach No Members Outreach No Institutions  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Commercial FIN development      
Bank Credit  -0.038*** -0.028* -0.019° -0.045*** -0.008 -0.008 
       
Macro-controls       
Inflation -0.016 -0.023 -0.005 0.087*** 0.034** 0.034** 
lnGNIpercap 1.522*** 4.711*** 6.793*** 2.009*** 0.95 0.957 
GNIgrowth 0.025* 0.015 0.005 0.057*** 0.004 0.003 
FDI -0.054 0.057 0.016 -0.035 -0.012 -0.012 
lnAID 0.112 1.216 1.188** -0.198 0.171 0.175 
Popdensity -0.001 0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 
       
Regional control yes yes no yes yes no 
       
Model stats       
N 665 665 665 664 664 664 
R² 0.1 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.12 0.002 
F-stat/Wald chi² 18.36*** 25.38*** 3.88*** 14.09*** 17.50** 1.37 
Method pooled OLS RE FE pooled OLS RE FE 
Notes:  FE unable to include regional dummies because of first-differencing resulting in lower joint 
significance and R²s 
Breusch-Pagan LM test suggests appropriateness of RE 
*, ** and *** means significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
 ° means significance between 10 and 15% level 
 
 
But first, in order to test the robustness of our results, some of the regressions are re-
estimated to control for potential causality bias. Indeed, it could be that cooperative 
development also influences overall financial sector development. As explained in the 
                                                 
certain level of development and thus also influences positively outreach of cooperatives.  
18 We also tested the influence the GINI-coefficient has on the relationship. However, no significant 
relationship could be detected. Furthermore, our number of observations reduces to around 250, so also our 
model statistics become worse. 
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method section, we account for this by using IV and Hausman-Taylor regressions. Table 4 
estimates a 2-step Least Square regression, where Bank Credit is instrumented by cost of 
business start-up procedures; number of start-up procedures to register a business; 
number of procedures to register property; time required to enforce a contract and number 
of procedures to enforce a contract. In general, Table 4 shows similar results to the ones 
obtained in the standard regressions. The negative relationship is further confirmed, 
although we only find a significant coefficient for outreach in terms of members. We can 
thus conclude that reverse causality does not bias our results to a large extent.  
 
Additionally, Table 4, columns (5) and (6), test if the relationship between cooperative 
sector and commercial financial sector development changes, when we control for 
microfinance sector development. The general negative relation between the commercial 
financial sector and the cooperative sector is upheld. Moreover, we cannot find a large 
influence of microfinance on the development of the cooperative sector. Our data suggests 
that there is no direct clear relationship between microfinance and cooperative 
development, meaning that the two sectors may be developing independently or 
mutually.19 This is an interesting route for further research. 
 
  
                                                 
19 The OLS regression gives a 10% significant positive coefficient, so more microfinance, more cooperative 
development, while the relationship between financial cooperatives and the commercial banking sector does 
not significantly change. This result would suggest that there is room for both the microfinance and the 
cooperative sector to develop. However, MIX market data catches a wide range of institutions (in some 
countries some financial cooperatives may be considered MFIs), so we do not want to draw any final 
conclusions from these data as there may be some overlap between the two sectors. The specific relationship 
between financial cooperatives and microfinance sector development is an interesting route to be explored in 
future research.                      
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Table 4  
Accounting for endogeneity using instruments: 2SLS and HT-approach 
And controlling for Microfinance Outreach 
  Outreach  No Members 
Outreach  
No Institutions 
Outreach  
No Members 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Commercial FIN 
d l  
      
Bank Credit  -0.223*** -0.020* -0.038*** -0.003 -0.041* -0.215*** 
       
Macro-controls       
Inflation -0.019 -0.012 0.026* 0.028*** 0.058 -0.051 
lnGNIpercap 6.898*** 5.806*** 1.262** 0.667*** 4.499*** 6.449*** 
GNIgrowth 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.01 0.074 0.047 
FDI -0.176 0.036 -0.036* -0.018 0.016 -0.051 
lnAID 1.108** 1.363*** 0.199* 0.09 1.534** 0.918* 
Popdensity 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 
 
Microfinance Outreach     0.095 0.233 
       
Regional control yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Model stats       
N 276 665 289 742 367 223 
R² 0.10  0.14  0.05 0.11 
F-stat/Wald chi² 34.46*** 141.33*** 27.81*** 28.67*** 23.87*** 30.92*** 
Sargan-Hansen p-value 0.001  0.348    
First-stage F-test 8.99***  8.99***    
Method 2SLS HT 2SLS HT RE IV 
Notes: In 2SLS bank Credit is instrumented by cost of business start-up; number of formal start-up 
procedures, number of formal procedures to register property; time required to enforce a contract; 
number of procedures to enforce a contract. 
Validity of instruments assessed using the Sargan-Hansen statistic which tests the null that excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the instrument set. 
First-stage F-test asserts joint significance in the first-stage regression of the 2SLS-procedure which 
regresses the endogeneous variable (bank credit) on the chosen instruments. 
*, ** and *** means significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
Overall, these empirical findings support that financial cooperatives are institutions that are 
capable of overcoming market failure and reach more clients in countries where the 
banking sector is weak, this way creating access to finance for an important number of 
people. However, an expansion of the banking sector negatively influences the outreach of 
financial cooperatives by reducing the need for cooperative finance and negatively 
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influences cooperative development. In what follows, we explore in depth how the level of 
economic development influences these relationships. 
 
4.3. Overall level of economic development 
Research suggests that the overall level of development influences financial sector 
development (Levine, 2004; Claessens and Laeven, 2005 and Ahlin et al., 2011; among 
others). Also institutional differences may play a significant role (Dort et al., 2014). In 
order to assess the influence of the overall level of development of an economy, which is 
traditionally correlated with the quality of institutions, we investigate this relationship more 
into depth. In order to test whether relationships change depending on the level of economic 
development, we split our sample of developing countries into a subsample of countries 
with the 25% of highest GNI/cap and the 25% of lowest GNI/cap.20 Table 5 also assesses 
the interaction between Bank Credit and the dummyGNIhigh, which takes 1 if the country 
belongs to the 25th percentile of countries with the highest GNI per capita, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
Both analyses suggest that, as countries further develop, the negative relation between the 
commercial and cooperative financial sector, grows stronger. Indeed, Table 5 shows that 
the coefficient of Bank Credit is negative and highly significant in the case of the 25% part 
of richest countries (column 2), while not in the 25% poorest part (column 1), and the 
interaction effect turns out significant (column 3). The Random Effects (column 4) and 
Fixed Effects (column 5) regressions confirm the significance of the interaction term21. 
Also outreach in terms of institutions (see Appendix C) shows similar results regarding the 
interaction effect.  
 
These results insinuate that in underdeveloped economies that have low levels of GNI per 
capita, there is room for both financial segments to develop. The relative low development 
                                                 
20 We have also conducted split-samples tests for institutional differences using the ICRG political risk 
indictor as conducted in the paper of Dort et al. (2014), but we have found no significant difference between 
samples of countries with high and low political risk.  
21 We do not find any significant result for the split-samples though. This could be due to the reduced number 
of observations. 
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of the economy, which results in low infrastructural development, seems to make the 
commercial banking sector underdeveloped and results in a high proportion of unbanked 
people. However, once economies develop, the two segments seem to stand in more direct 
competition with each other. This could be explained by the need for larger loan sizes by 
clients, which is higher in richer economies, and the fact that the infrastructure is often 
more developed. Therefore it is less costly for banks to reach out in more remote areas, 
which are often the areas where the cooperatives are active (Hirschland et al., 2008). There 
is thus less need for cooperative finance as a market failure solution in these countries. This 
negatively affects cooperative outreach, and is in line with what Ahlin et al. (2011) and 
Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) find for the microfinance sector. Ahlin et al. (2011) 
furthermore find that there is a positive relationship between microfinance development 
and level of economic development until a certain point. Once economies start to be too 
developed, there is less demand for small-scale financial products (ibid.).22 Cooperative 
finance thus seems to be subject to the risk of being crowded out by commercial finance 
once this sector is sufficiently developed and the overall economy provides sufficient 
infrastructure, reducing costs for commercial banks and thus reducing financial 
cooperatives’ comparative advantage of reaching out to remote areas. 
 
  
                                                 
22 We also investigated a non-linear effect of Bank Credit by adding the squared term as an extra regressor. 
But, regardless of the estimation method (pooled OLS, RE, FE) the coefficient on the squared term is always 
close to zero and never statistically significant. 
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Table 5 
Stronger effect in richer economies 
 Outreach No Members 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 25% 
poorest 
25% 
richest 
interaction 
term 
interaction 
term 
interaction 
term 
      
Bank Credit 0.037* -0.035*** -0.015** -0.013 0.001 
Bank Credit * dumGNIhigh   -0.037*** -0.024** -0.026** 
lnGNIpercap   2.260*** 5.192*** 7.459*** 
Inflation -0.061 -0.080** -0.022 -0.026 -0.007 
FDI -0.419** 0.119 -0.0918 0.0421 0.006 
GNIgrowth -0.032 0.096 0.011 0.008 -0.001 
lnAID -0.386 -0.933*** 0.045 1.172** 1.133** 
Popdensity 0.001 0.005** -0.001 0.002 -0.011 
      
Regional control yes yes yes yes no 
      
Constant 13.00 24.49*** -10.10* -54.36*** -74.63*** 
      
Model stats      
N 164 166 665 665 665 
R² 0.089 0.320 0.120 0.188 0.196 
F-stat/Wald chi² 5.957*** 21.81*** 19.50*** 26.03*** 3.665*** 
Model pooled 
OLS 
pooled 
OLS 
pooled 
OLS 
RE FE 
Notes:  Split sample results are not significant with RE and FE method, this could be due to the reduced 
number of observations. 
 *, ** and *** means significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 See Appendix C for the results of outreach in terms of institutions. 
 
 
4.4. Savings and commercial sector development 
To have a more complete view of financial cooperative sector growth, Table 6 investigates 
the impact of the commercial banking sector on the ability of financial cooperatives to 
mobilize savings from their members. Savings is a key element for the sustainability of 
financial cooperatives (Guinnane, 1994; Branch and Baker, 2000; Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010). Savings is a question of security and proximity: people save more if they 
are sure that their savings are in a safe place and if they can save on a regular basis without 
having to walk long distances (and thus have lower transaction costs). In this analysis, we 
therefore look at banks’ network coverage using Bank Branches and Bank ATMs. We again 
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use both pooled-OLS and random-effects methods.  
 
The pooled-OLS regression of Table 6 (column 3) shows a positive but insignificant effect 
of the domestic credit provided by the banking sector on the financial cooperatives ability 
to collect savings. Banks’ network coverage (Table 6, columns (1) and (2)) on the other 
hand, positively influences the financial cooperatives’ ability to collect savings. When the 
number of bank ATMs increases with one unit per 100,000 inhabitants, the average amount 
of savings saved by the cooperative members increases with $20.55 (which corresponds 
with a marginal effect of 3 % around the mean). Random-effects regressions (4) and (5) 
corroborate this positive relationship: financial cooperatives are mobilizing more savings 
in countries where the banking sector is more geographically present. This could be 
explained by an overall increase in ‘savings habit’ with the presence of commercial banks 
(Sahoo and Das, 2013). This would mean that people are more aware of the importance of 
monetary savings once the overall financial sector develops (Masson et al., 1998). So the 
development of the whole banking sector would increase financial literacy (Cole et al., 
2011) and stimulate the overall savings behavior of the population. Since savings 
mobilization is key to sustainability for financial cooperatives, this spillover effect is an 
important positive synergy between financial cooperatives and commercial banks. This 
positive synergy could additionally be explained by the use of bank branches by financial 
cooperatives to manage money transfers and savings within their own networks. Finally, 
cooperatives could use bank branches to store their excess savings, also resulting in positive 
effects on cooperatives’ sustainability.  
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Table 6 
The relation between savings in cooperatives and proximity/infrastructure of the commercial 
financial sector  
  FC savings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Commercial FIN proximity      
Bank ATMs 20.55***   11.79*   
Bank branches  28.57**   9.38  
Bank Credit   0.42   10.25 
       
Macro-controls       
Inflation -12.73** -6.23 -18.83*** -10.87* -10.49* -10.93 
lnGNIcap -220.98** 193.54*** 238.11*** 157.43 365.48** 40.02 
GNIgrowth -56.93** -36.01 -20.88 -51.92 -45.75* -53.38* 
FDI 54.45** 31.03 37.25** 20.04 14.19 13.91 
lnAID -79.84 7.39 -16.22 114.40* 90.23* 78.34* 
Popdensity -0.100 -0.362 -0.245* -0.715 -0.928 -0.824 
       
Regional control yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Model stats       
N 193 223 653 193 223 179 
R² 0.44 0.33 0.16 0.33 0.25 0.33 
F-stat/Wald chi² 13.32*** 13.15*** 18.86*** 27.98*** 22.58*** 38.82*** 
Method pooled OLS pooled OLS pooled OLS RE RE RE 
Notes:  *, ** and *** means significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.     
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS        
 
Studies have shown the positive impact of institutional diversity on financial sector 
stability. The importance of this institutional diversity has been highlighted once more 
through the recent financial crisis. In developing countries, the underdeveloped 
commercial banking sector has created room for alternative formal and informal 
institutions serving people who do not have access to commercial bank financial services. 
A major question is how this institutional diversity tends to be affected by the development 
of the commercial financial sector in developing countries. 
 
Financial cooperatives are one of the oldest and most widespread types of alternative 
financial institutions. They were first developed in Europe and North America initially to 
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serve financially excluded people. In the process of financial development, they managed 
to keep a relatively large market share in the US and several European countries. Although 
they suffer from isomorphic pressures in those countries, recent studies have stressed their 
positive impact on the financial sector stability. But, cooperative banks in developed 
countries were developed in a very different context being relatively protected from market 
globalization and international competition at the early stage of their development and 
sometimes benefiting from favorable legislations.  
 
In the process of financial sector development in the developing world, one could wonder 
how financial cooperatives and commercial banks interact. To the best of our knowledge, 
this paper is the first investigating this interaction empirically using a large database on a 
global scale.  
 
Our results are threefold. First, they show that financial cooperatives tend to reach more 
members in countries where the commercial banking sector is weak. This validates the 
market failure hypothesis: financial cooperatives are real alternatives and serve people that 
are excluded from the commercial banking sector. Second, our analysis reveals that in the 
process of commercial bank expansion, financial cooperatives run the risk of being 
crowded out. They encounter more difficulties to reach a significant number of people. 
This could partly be explained by the ability of commercial banks to offer a more diverse 
and flexible set of products (including longer-term investment loans) and to be more cost-
efficient and less time consuming. The overall economic development of the countries also 
plays an important role:  in ‘richer’ developing economies the two financial segments stand 
in more direct competition. This could be explained by a lower demand for small-scale 
financial products in those economies and more developed infrastructure, which results in 
lower costs for banks wanting to serve more remote areas, which are traditionally served 
by financial cooperatives. Third, our results reveal a more complex relationship. Financial 
cooperatives seem also to benefit from some kind of bank presence. Namely, the capacity 
of financial cooperatives to mobilize savings is bigger in countries with more developed 
financial sectors. This is especially so in countries where the banks’ network coverage is 
large. This tends to indicate that financial cooperatives use the bank branch network to 
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secure their saving’s surplus and potentially use it to manage savings within their own 
network. A higher bank presence could also generate positive spillover effects increasing 
the overall private savings habit of the whole population.  
 
Given the increased recognized positive impact of institutional diversity on financial sector 
stability and the fact that financial cooperatives play a social role too, these results are 
important for policy makers wanting to support financial cooperatives and lead to a number 
of policy suggestions. First, setting up an efficient legislation taking into account all 
ownership models is key to preserve financial institutional diversity. As shown by the 
current discussions in Europe on Basel III, the new banking legislation following the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, this is not easy to do. Legislation is generally designed to fit the 
dominant model and can create unexpected additional costs for alternative financial 
institutions (EACB, 2014). As an example, Ferri and Pesce (2012) and Jones and Kalmi 
(2012) argue that the new European banking legislation creates distortions that may push 
alternative banking institutions, such as cooperative and savings banks, into business 
models outside their nature. The legislator in developing countries should develop 
legislation that takes into account the specific nature of the cooperative and its specific 
ownership structure.  
 
Second, policy makers should evaluate the risk for financial cooperatives to be crowded 
out by commercial bank development and assess the relevance of supporting them. This 
could happen through both financial and technical policies. Cooperatives could be excluded 
or be subject to special fiscal policies. These measures could also be used to stimulate 
networking of small local financial cooperatives, a way for them to scale up and share 
certain management or administrative tasks and make use of economies of scale, without 
compromising their cooperative nature. Moreover, financial cooperatives in developing 
countries often suffer from a lack of technical capacities and insufficient qualified human 
resources. Therefore, support programs to help them to get better in these matters could be 
set up. 
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Finally, policies favoring the positive synergies between commercial banks and financial 
cooperatives could be implemented. Our results suggest that the possibility to secure 
savings positively influences the sustainability of the cooperatives. This relationship could 
be further exploited and facilities to stimulate securing savings should be further 
developed. As discussed, synergies with banks can also help financial cooperatives to 
broaden the scope of services they offer, with products such as salaries domiciliation or 
remittances transfer favoring savings collection. Also facilities for liquidity transfers inside 
cooperative networks are important. An adequate regulation could help these types of 
synergies to be further developed. Additionally, incentives for banks to create alliances 
with financial cooperatives could be stimulated, either through technical support or fiscal 
policy. Cooperatives could also be directly supported in the construction of these types of 
alliances with commercial banks.  
 
Our study evidently faces a number of limitations that offer some interesting routes for 
further research. First, our analysis is a macro analysis, so it gives a general tendency and 
tends to assess certain relationships but does not give evidence of the specific drivers of 
this relationship. Second, since the information on cooperatives is aggregated on a country 
level it makes impossible to control for individual institutional characteristics. Future 
studies could investigate the relationship between financial cooperatives and the banking 
sector more deeply using disaggregated information at the level of the cooperative. Second, 
the interaction between financial cooperatives and banks could be explored at a more micro 
level. Country case studies could certainly shed an additional light on the more complex 
relationships between the two sectors. Thirdly, it could be interesting to look at the 
emergence of social and ethical banks in the developed countries (Cornée and Szafarz, 
2014), which are often organized as cooperatives in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
These events have demonstrated the importance and necessity of alternative models of 
financial institutions and could eventually result in a revival of the cooperative sector.   
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
List of the countries and financial cooperative development 
Country 
 
Outreach  
No Members 
in %1 
Outreach  
No Institutions  
in %2 
 
country 
 
Outreach  
No Members 
in % 
Outreach  
No Institutions  
in % 
1990 2011 1990 2011  1990 2011 1990 2011 
Argentina 0.44 0.37* 0.07 0.05*  Mexico 0.77 4.59 0.27 0.05 
Bangladesh 0.04 0.31 0.02 0.72  Namibia 0.20* 0.18* 1.35* 1.00* 
Benin 0.19 31.08 0.27 0.43  Nepal 0.02* 3.31 0.30* 3.30 
Bolivia 4.07 7.19 2.54 0.24  Nicaragua 0.24 1.09 0.58 0.10 
Brazil 0.41 2.98 0.24 0.39  Nigeria 5.02 0.62* 15.38 0.04* 
Burkina Faso 0.23 16.99 0.72 0.32  Panama 6.16 4.37 6.83 4.82 
Cameroon 1.12 3.23 2.04 1.09  Papua New Guinea 3.96 9.62 0.96 0.29 
Chile 1.67* 8.28 0.77* 0.24  Paraguay 2.76 15.82 1.39 0.72 
Colombia 1.38 6.07 0.69 0.42  Peru 5.71 4.92 1.41 0.54 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 1.48 1.41* 0.39 0.42* 
 Philippines 0.13 6.73 0.66 1.26 
Costa Rica 5.81 17.10 1.69 1.40  Rwanda 8.30 11.69* 1.67 1.33* 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.18 14.26 0.62 0.31  Senegal 0.04 30.93 0.28 1.84 
Dominican 
Republic 1.58 6.00 0.93 0.15 
 Seychelles3 0.07* 0.14* 1.43 1.16 
Ecuador 13.44* 18.07 4.49* 0.23  Sierra Leone 0.20 0.18* 1.76 1.34* 
El Salvador 0.70 3.71 0.88 0.51  South Africa 0.01* 0.08 0.09* 0.10 
Ethiopia 0.44 0.54 1.00 5.12  Sri Lanka 5.93* 5.74 41.96* 40.44 
Gambia 0.14 4.48 1.04 3.88  Swaziland 1.17 5.70 1.27 5.62 
Ghana 0.69 2.05 0.99 1.69  Tanzania 0.74 3.66 1.52 11.37 
Guatemala 1.96 11.67 0.58 0.17  Thailand 3.47 6.30 1.33 2.97 
Honduras 2.84 13.47 1.72 1.07  Togo 1.17 37.24 3.41 1.41 
India 0.07 2.31 0.08 0.13  Uganda 2.30 6.47 2.38 6.12 
Indonesia 0.17 1.02 0.81 0.38  Uruguay 5.99 4.96 1.06 0.98 
Kenya 7.23 17.47 6.74 11.15  Uzbekistan 0.003* 0.79* 0.02* 0.37 
Korea 5.93 14.01 3.07 1.92  Venezuela 0.35* 1.47* 0.47* 1.99* 
Liberia 1.73 0.72 3.34 3.03  Vietnam 1.53* 2.31 1.12* 1.25 
Malawi 0.35 1.33 1.23 0.30  Zambia 2.42 0.03 4.71 0.19 
Malaysia 0.17 0.85 1.70 0.06  Zimbabwe 0.24 1.14 1.12 0.42 
Mauritius 4.13 9.89 7.08 7.39       
Notes:  
1. Outreach No Members in % is the sum of all the financial cooperatives’ members at the country level divided by the 
country population older than fifteen years. 
2. Outreach No Institutions in % indicates the number of financial cooperatives in a country for 100,000 inhabitants.  
3. Seychelles’ Outreach No Members is obtained by dividing the number of financial cooperatives’ members by the 
total population instead of the population older than 15 years.  
* means we do not have the figure in the database for the year 1990 or 2011. We thus report the closest figure from 
these years. 
- 36 - 
 
Appendix B 
Main outreach and instrumental variables  
Variables Explanations 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Outreach No Members (a/b) The percentage of the population older than 15 year served by 
financial cooperatives in a country 
Financial cooperative members (a) The number of people served by the financial cooperatives in a country 
Population > 15 (b) The total population older than 15 years (see population for the 
definition of total population of a country).  
Outreach No Institutions 
(c/d)*100.000 
The number of financial cooperative institutions for 100,000 
inhabitants 
No financial cooperatives (c) The number of financial cooperatives in a country 
Population (d) The population is based on the de facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are 
generally considered part of the population of the country of origin. 
FC Savings (e/a) The average savings per cooperative member 
Total savings (c) Total amount of savings in USD collected by financial cooperatives in a 
country 
Microfinance outreach (f/b) The total number of micro-borrowers of MFIs active in one country 
divided by the total population older than 15 years 
Microfinance clients (f) The total number of micro-borrowers of MFIs active in one country 
 
Instrumental variables 
 
Cost of business start-up procedures  
 
Cost to register a business is normalized by presenting it as a percentage 
of gross national income (GNI) per capita. 
Number start-up procedures to 
register a business  
 
Start-up procedures are those required to start a business, including 
interactions to obtain necessary permits and licenses and to complete all 
inscriptions, verifications, and notifications to start operations. Data are 
for businesses with specific characteristics of ownership, size, and type 
of production. 
Number of procedures to register 
property 
Number of procedures to register property is the number of procedures 
required for a businesses to secure rights to property. 
Time required to enforce a contract 
 
Time required to enforce a contract is the number of calendar days from 
the filing of the lawsuit in court until the final determination and, in 
appropriate cases, payment. 
Number of procedures to enforce a 
contract  
 
Number of procedures to enforce a contract are the number of 
independent actions, mandated by law or courts, that demand interaction 
between the parties of a contract or between them and the judge or court 
officer. 
 
- 37 - 
 
Appendix C 
Split samples for outreach in terms of institutions 
 Outreach No Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 25% poorest 25% richest 
interaction 
term 
interaction 
term 
interaction 
term 
      
Bank Credit 0.009 0.007 -0.033*** -0.001 -0.001 
Bank Credit * dumGNIhigh   -0.020** -0.009* -0.009* 
lnGNIpercap   2.403*** 1.172 1.198 
Inflation 0.060*** -0.013 0.085*** 0.034*** 0.034** 
FDI 0.030 0.267*** -0.055 -0.015 -0.015 
GNIgrowth -0.023 -0.020 0.050*** 0.001 0.001 
lnAID -0.0380 -0.577*** -0.233 0.154 0.156 
Popdensity -0.001** 0.009*** 0.001 -0.0001 -0.001 
      
Regional control yes yes yes yes no 
      
Constant 2.696 10.57*** -9.133 -8.983 -9.428 
 
Model stats 
     
N 164 165 664 664 664 
R² 0.167 0.726 0.149 0.0731 0.073 
F-stat/Wald chi² 13.54*** 62.97*** 13.23*** 18.66*** 1.371*** 
Model pooled OLS 
pooled 
OLS 
pooled 
OLS 
RE FE 
Notes:  Split sample results are not significant with RE and FE method, this could be due to the reduced 
number of observations. 
 *, ** and *** means significance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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